Iran Seeks to Bar US Ships as Hormuz Deal With Oman Advances
A draft framework being negotiated between Iran and Oman for reopening the Strait of Hormuz reportedly includes a provision to bar ships from the United States, Israel, and other states Iran designates as hostile from transiting the strait.
The draft also reportedly requires vessels linked to states considered to have caused damage to Iran to pay compensation before being permitted to use the waterway.
Iran has described the agreement as being in its "final stage" of drafting, and the development follows an extended regional conflict that began in February 2026, during which shipping through the strait was repeatedly disrupted.
Officials from the United States have stated that any temporary shipping routes must operate "without any impediments," rejecting the principle that any single party can control transit through what it characterises as an international waterway.
The negotiations are being mediated through Oman, which has historically played a facilitating role between Iran and Western states.
The Strait of Hormuz — Chokepoint Geography
The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime chokepoint linking the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. Its northern shore is held by Iran and its southern shore by Oman's Musandam exclave, making both states the only littoral parties to the strait itself, even though the wider Persian Gulf borders several other states, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq, and Bahrain.
Key Details
- Narrowest point is about 33-34 km (21 miles) wide, with two 3 km-wide shipping lanes separated by a buffer zone.
- Roughly 20-25% of the world's seaborne oil trade and about one-fifth of global LNG trade normally transits the strait.
- The 2026 regional conflict, which began in late February with strikes involving the United States and Israel against Iran, led Iran to declare the strait "closed" from early March 2026, sharply cutting tanker traffic.
- Asian economies, including India, China, Japan, and South Korea, are the primary destination markets for oil moving through Hormuz, making regional disruption a direct energy-security concern for them.
Because both shores of the strait's narrowest navigable channel lie in Iranian or Omani territorial waters, any bilaterally negotiated shipping framework between the two states directly determines the terms on which international shipping — including, potentially, US and other flagged vessels — can transit.
UNCLOS: Innocent Passage vs Transit Passage Through International Straits
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982 sets out two distinct navigational regimes relevant to straits like Hormuz: "innocent passage" (Article 17-26) applicable in territorial seas generally, and "transit passage" (Articles 37-44), a stronger right specific to straits used for international navigation connecting one area of high seas/EEZ to another.
Key Details
- Under Article 25, a coastal state may temporarily suspend innocent passage in specified areas of its territorial sea for security reasons, but such suspension cannot be applied in a way that discriminates against the ships of particular states.
- Under Articles 38 and 44, transit passage through international straits "shall not be impeded" and cannot be suspended by the bordering states for any purpose, including during military exercises — a materially stronger guarantee than innocent passage.
- Iran has signed but not ratified UNCLOS, and does not accept transit passage as binding customary international law; it applies its own 1993 domestic maritime law and treats passage through the strait as subject to its consent, closer to an "innocent passage" standard.
- The United States and most other maritime states maintain that transit passage through Hormuz applies as customary international law regardless of Iran's non-ratification.
A framework that selectively bars ships of specific states (US, Israel, and others deemed hostile) sits in direct tension with the non-discrimination principle attached even to the more restrictive innocent-passage regime under Article 25, and is incompatible with the transit-passage regime that other states argue applies to Hormuz — explaining the US position that no party may impose "impediments" or "approvals" on transit.
Oman's Mediating Role in Iran-US Diplomacy
Oman has historically served as a discreet interlocutor between Iran and the United States, distinct from the multilateral P5+1/E3 format used for Iran's nuclear negotiations. It hosted secret back-channel talks from around 2011-2013 that laid the groundwork for the eventual 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Key Details
- Oman's approach is rooted in a policy of neutrality among regional rivals, allowing it to host both Iranian and Western/Gulf officials without formal alignment.
- The current Iran-Oman shipping framework negotiation is a bilateral mechanism, distinct from any direct Iran-US channel, though it is intended to have practical effect on US and allied shipping.
- Muscat has again been used as a venue for indirect Iran-US contacts during the post-February 2026 conflict period.
The choice of Oman as the mediating and drafting partner for the Hormuz shipping framework, rather than direct US-Iran negotiation, follows the established pattern of using Oman as a trusted third party where Iran and Western states lack direct diplomatic channels.
- Strait of Hormuz narrowest navigable width: approximately 33-34 km (21 miles).
- Share of global seaborne oil trade transiting the strait in normal conditions: approximately 20-25%.
- Regional conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran began around February 28, 2026; Iran declared the strait "closed" from early March 2026.
- UNCLOS transit passage (non-suspendable): Articles 38 and 44; innocent passage (temporarily suspendable, non-discriminatory): Article 25.
- Iran has signed but not ratified UNCLOS (1982) and applies its own 1993 domestic maritime law instead.
- Oman-brokered back-channel Iran-US talks (from around 2011-2013) preceded the 2015 JCPOA.