Stable India-China ties will help build ‘multi-polar Asia’ and ‘multi-polar world’: Jaishankar
On the margins of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Manila, the External Affairs Minister held talks with China's Foreign Minister, stating that a stable and cooperative India-China relationship based on "mutual respect, mutual interest and mutual sensitivity" can contribute to a "multi-polar Asia" and a "multi-polar world"
Progress in India-China normalisation since the October 2024 Kazan meeting was noted, including resumption of direct flights and the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, alongside continuing concerns over fair market access and trade balance
In a separate bilateral review with Russia's Foreign Minister, India raised concerns over the safety of Indian seafarers, following incidents involving attacks on merchant vessels
India also participated in a Quad Foreign Ministers' meeting on the sidelines, where the four countries reaffirmed commitment to a "free and open Indo-Pacific" and support for ASEAN centrality
Multipolarity as a Foreign Policy Doctrine
"Multipolarity" refers to a global order with several centres of power rather than one (unipolar) or two (bipolar) dominant states. India's foreign policy has increasingly framed itself as a proponent of a multipolar world and, more specifically, a "multipolar Asia" — signalling that Asian regional order should not be shaped by any single power's primacy.
Key Details
- The concept is distinct from India's traditional doctrine of Non-Alignment (Cold War era) and its successor, Strategic Autonomy (post-Cold War) — multipolarity is the structural goal, strategic autonomy is the means
- India uses multipolarity rhetoric in multiple fora: BRICS expansion (2024 addition of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE), G20 presidency (2023) themes of "Voice of Global South," and bilateral framing with both China and Russia
- The "three mutuals" formulation (mutual respect, mutual interest, mutual sensitivity) has been used by Indian officials as shorthand for the conditions needed to stabilise India-China ties post-Galwan (2020)
By framing India-China stabilisation in terms of building a "multi-polar Asia," the statement links a bilateral normalisation process to India's broader multipolarity doctrine, distinguishing it from a purely transactional bilateral reset.
Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific
The Quad is an informal strategic forum of India, the United States, Japan, and Australia. It originated from the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami relief coordination ("Tsunami Core Group"), was formally floated in 2007, dormant for a decade, and revived in 2017 on the sidelines of ASEAN summits in Manila.
Key Details
- The Quad is not a formal treaty alliance — it functions through summits, foreign ministers' meetings, and working groups (vaccines, critical technology, infrastructure, maritime domain awareness)
- Its stated objective is a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) — supporting freedom of navigation, rules-based order, and ASEAN centrality, without naming China explicitly in most joint statements
- India hosted a Quad Foreign Ministers' meeting in New Delhi earlier in the year, making the Manila engagement the second ministerial-level Quad meeting of the year
The Quad meeting on the ARF sidelines shows India simultaneously engaging in China-focused normalisation and Quad-based Indo-Pacific coordination — illustrating India's "multi-alignment" approach of engaging competing strategic blocs without exclusive commitment to either.
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and East Asia Summit (EAS)
The ARF is ASEAN's primary platform for security dialogue and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific, distinct from the ASEAN grouping itself and from the East Asia Summit (EAS).
Key Details
- ARF was established in 1994 (inaugural meeting in Bangkok) and now has 27 participants, including all 10 ASEAN members and dialogue partners such as India, China, the US, Russia, and Japan
- The EAS, a separate leaders-level forum, was launched in 2005 in Kuala Lumpur with India as a founding member, alongside ASEAN, Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea; the US and Russia joined later (2011)
- India's "Act East Policy" (successor to "Look East," launched 1992, renamed 2014) uses these ASEAN-centred platforms as its primary institutional anchor
The ARF sidelines served as the venue for India's simultaneous bilateral (China, Russia) and minilateral (Quad) engagements, demonstrating how ASEAN-centred architecture functions as a hub for wider Indo-Pacific diplomacy.
- Modi-Xi informal meeting at BRICS Kazan Summit: October 23, 2024 — first formal meeting between the two leaders in five years, following the 2020 Galwan clash
- Quad members: India, United States, Japan, Australia; revived in 2017 after a decade-long hiatus (first floated 2007)
- ARF established 1994 (Bangkok); 27 participants
- EAS launched 2005; India a founding member among 16 original participants (18 after US and Russia joined in 2011)
- BRICS expanded in 2024 to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and UAE